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Relationship lending is a common practice in credit ﬁnancing all over the world,
particularly in Germany. On the basis of a comprehensive data set comprising in-
formation on ﬁrm-bank relationships for more than 16,000 observations, this study
analyses the determinants of relationship lending in Germany. We ﬁnd that small,
young and R&D-intensive ﬁrms tend to choose relationship lending. Furthermore,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with a higher creditworthiness are more likely to choose a rela-
tionship lender. We ﬁnd that the importance of relationship lending stayed roughly
constant since the mid 90s.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21; G32
Keywords: Relationship banking; German banking system; SMENon technical Summary
When applying relationship lending, bank and entrepreneur are engaged in a close
relationship. During the last years, there has been the impression that relationship
lending loses ground. Quantitative rating systems and new developments in the
banking industry, for instance securitization, were believed to repress relationship
lending. Considering the traditional prevalence of relationship lending in Germany,
a change in the banks’ business model may have a large impact on economic growth
and employment, especially for the small and medium-sized ﬁrms, which fund them-
selves to a large degree with bank loans.
The aim of the present study is twofold: First, we analyze, which determinants
inﬂuence the choice of a housebank and, second, we check, whether relationship
lending lost ground in Germany. Our main contribution to the literature is our data
set: The data set we use in this paper is signiﬁcantly larger than the ones used in
the literature so far. Moreover, the data set is not only composed of a cross-section
of ﬁrms, but there are time series of each ﬁrm, so that we are able to keep track of
the lending relationships.
The results of our study can be summarized in three core statements: (i) Especially
small, young and R&D intensive ﬁrms seek a housebank as their lender. This result
is in line with the theory: Especially those ﬁrms have problems to convince potential
lenders of the quality of their projects. (ii) Firms of high creditworthiness tend to
opt for relationship lending. (iii) Contrary to the presumption from above, there
are no hints that relationship lending in Germany has lost ground in the last years.Nicht-technische Zusammenfassung
Beim Hausbankprinzip (”Relationship lending”) gehen Bank und Unternehmer eine
enge Bindung ein. W¨ ahrend der vergangenen Jahre entstand der Eindruck, dass das
Hausbankprinzip an Bedeutung verliert. Quantitative Ratingsysteme und neuere
Entwicklungen im Bankgesch¨ aft, wie zum Beispiel Verbriefungen, - so war die Ver-
mutung - w¨ urden das Hausbankprinzip zur¨ uckdr¨ angen. Vor dem Hintergrund der
traditionell großen Verbreitung des Hausbankprinzips in Deutschland k¨ onnte eine
Ver¨ anderung der Gesch¨ aftspraxis der Banken weitreichende Folgen f¨ ur Wachstum
und Besch¨ aftigung haben, besonders f¨ ur den Mittelstand, der sich typischerweise in
hohem Umfang ¨ uber Kredite ﬁnanziert.
Ziel der vorliegenden Studie ist zweierlei: Zum einen untersuchen wir, welche Fak-
toren die Entscheidung f¨ ur eine Hausbank beeinﬂussen, und zum anderen ¨ uberpr¨ ufen
wir, ob das Hausbankprinzip in Deutschland tats¨ achlich an Bedeutung verloren hat.
Unser Beitrag gegen¨ uber der bisherigen Literatur liegt vor allem in dem Datensatz:
Der hier verwendete Datensatz ist deutlich umfangreicher. Außerdem handelt es sich
dabei nicht einfach um Daten f¨ ur einen Querschnitt von Firmen, sondern f¨ ur jede
Firma liegen Zeitreihen vor, so dass wir grunds¨ atzlich auch die zeitliche Entwicklung
der Kreditbeziehungen verfolgen k¨ onnen.
Die Ergebnisse unserer Studie lassen sich in drei Kernaussagen zusammenfassen. (1)
Besonders kleine, junge und forschungsaktive Unternehmen suchen eine Hausbank
als Kreditgeber. Dieses Ergebnis steht im Einklang mit der Theorie, denn gerade
diesen Unternehmen f¨ allt es schwer, potentielle Kreditgeber von ihrem Projekt zu
¨ uberzeugen. (2) Vor allem bonit¨ atsstarke Unternehmen w¨ ahlen eine Hausbank. (3)
Entgegen der obigen Vermutung ﬁnden wir keine Hinweise daf¨ ur, dass das Haus-
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Appendix 2 29Relationship lending
– Empirical evidence for Germany1
1 Introduction
It is common practice in credit ﬁnancing for close ties to exist between ﬁrms and
banks, termed relationship lending. Relationship lending exists all over the world,
including market-oriented banking systems such as the United States.2 One of
the countries where relationship lending is supposed to be especially prevalent is
Germany, often cited as the classical example of a bank-based system with strong
customer-borrower-relationships (see, eg, Elsas and Krahnen (1998)). The so-called
housebanks are supposed to be particularly important for the ﬁnancing of small and
medium-sized companies, which play a crucial role in the German economy.
Given the importance of relationship lending in Germany it is remarkable that there
are only a limited number of contributions on this subject. In this study, we focus
on the inﬂuence of borrowers’ characteristics. We examine the importance of two
issues. First, it is typically assumed that relationship lending helps to reduce in-
formation asymmetries between borrower and lender by the close contact between
the two parties. Therefore, companies that are especially exposed to high informa-
tion problems, such as small, young companies and companies with a high R&D
intensity, should choose a relationship lender. The evidence of our study is broadly
consistent with these predictions.
The second issue refers to a ﬁrm’s creditworthiness. The inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s credit
quality on relationship lending is seen contradictorily in the theoretical literature.
1 Christoph Memmel and Ingrid Stein: Deutsche Bundesbank. Christian Schmieder: Deutsche
Bundesbank and European Investment Bank. This paper represents the authors’ personal
opinions and does not necessarily reﬂect those of the Deutsche Bundesbank or the European
Investment Bank. We thank Wolfgang Bessler, Ralf Elsas, Bronwyn Hall, Martin Hellwig,
Wouter van Overfelt, Andreas Pﬁngsten, Birgit Schmitz, Isabell Schnabel, Mechthild Schrooten
and the participants at the GBSA 2006 Workshop, the Kleistvilla Workshop 2006, the Verein
fuer Socialpolitik 2006 Annual Congress, the DGF 2006 Annual Meeting, MPI Bonn seminar,
the SGF 2007 Annual Meeting, the FMA 2007 European Conference, the 2007 Meeting of the
Bundesbank Research Council and the Bankenworkshop 2007 at the University Muenster for
fruitful comments.
2 See, eg, Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Boot (2000).
1Depending on the model a ﬁrm’s credit quality inﬂuences the likelihood of relation-
ship lending negatively (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)), positively (von Thadden
(2004)) or the relation is inversely u-shaped (Rajan (1992)). Our study shows that
ﬁrms of a high credit quality tend to choose a relationship lender and is therefore
in line with the predictions of von Thadden (2004). He explains this result by a
positive selection process over time where bad ﬁrms are more likely to switch from
a relationship lender to an arm’s-length bank than high quality ﬁrms do.
Finally, we also examine whether the importance of relationship lending decreased
since the mid 90s. Due to better information processing facilities, more sophisticated
rating tools and the growth of securitization market banks are supposed to become
more and more to credit factories. However, we cannot observe such a trend for
Germany.
We diﬀer from previous empirical papers in several ways: Unlike most studies for
Germany (see Elsas (2005), Machauer and Weber (2000) and Neuberger and R¨ athke
(2006)) or other countries (see eg Detragiache et al. (2000)), our analysis is based
on a comprehensive database. The data set used for this study comprises a total of
around 16,000 observations with an annual frequency for the period from 1993 to
2004. Moreover, in contrast to previous literature our data set is not only a cross-
section of observations, but contains also the time dimension. Thus, we are able to
study how diﬀerences between ﬁrms and diﬀerences over time inﬂuence relationship
lending. Finally, our deﬁnition of relationship lending diﬀers from the literature
which, except to Elsas (2005), refers only to the number of lending relationships
as indicators for relationship lending.3 While this variable is certainly related to
the concept of relationship lending, it is too restrictive regarding large companies
as such companies typically have several lending relationships. Hence, we focus on
the degree of concentration of debt on one bank, but consider also the number of
lending relationships.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the hypotheses on the nature
3 This statement applies to the literature regarding the determinants of relationship lending.
Papers which take relationship lending as explanatory variable take a richer set of variables.
2of relationship lending in Germany. In Section 3 we provide an overview of the
underlying data set. Section 4 addresses descriptive statistics and shows ﬁrst results.
The results of the regressions are presented in Section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2 Hypotheses
We will begin with a short overview on the theoretical literature investigating the
importance of borrower characteristics for relationship lending; this represents the
starting point for the empirical analysis. We will summarise the predictions in three
hypotheses.
In their review of the ﬁnancial intermediation literature, Bhattacharaya and Thakor
(1993) conclude that informational frictions - asymmetric information and propri-
etary information - ”provide the most fundamental explanation for the existence of
(ﬁnancial) intermediaries”. This characterisation of banks applies particularly for
relationship lenders. Relationship lending implies close ties between borrower and
lender; this facilitates the information exchange between the two parties and thereby
enables credit rationing to be avoided. Lenders invest in gathering information from
their client ﬁrms, and borrowers are more inclined to reveal proprietary information.
As information asymmetries are especially large for small, young companies, we
expect that relationship lending will be more likely if a company is relatively small
and young. In our analysis, we take the logarithm of the company’s assets and of
the time since the company’s formation as a proxy for size and age, respectively.
Furthermore, we expect relationship lending to become more likely if the ﬁrm is
R&D or knowledge-intensive, as proprietary information exists in such companies.
As the ﬁrm’s R&D intensity cannot be directly measured, we alternatively refer to
information on the R&D and knowledge intensity of the ﬁrms’ industry sector. The
preceding discussion leads us to hypotheses 1 and 2:
Hypothesis 1: The probability of relationship lending decreases with the bor-
rower’s size and age.
3Hypothesis 2: The probability of relationship lending increases with the
R&D and knowledge intensity of the borrower’s industry.
Relationship lending does not only come along with beneﬁts, but also with costs.
For example, companies with a relationship lender may face only a soft-budget
constraint which makes it diﬃcult for the relationship lender to enforce the credit
contract (Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), see also Dewatripont and Maskin (1995)).
In the event of a default, it is much easier for the company to renegotiate the debt
contract if there is one main creditor than if there were multiple creditors. Thus,
companies with a relationship lender have a greater incentive to default strategically,
while ﬁrms with a large number of creditors tend to be disciplined by their lenders.
However, the costs of ineﬃcient renegotiation which exist with multiple creditors
prevail also if the ﬁrm defaults for liquidity reasons. Thus, there exists a trade oﬀ
between preventing strategic defaults (best achieved with multiple creditors) and low
cost of renegotiation in case of liquidity defaults (best achieved with one creditor).
As companies of low credit quality face a substantial risk of a liquidity default, they
should especially make sure that they receive high liquidation values and choose one
creditor or at least concentrate their borrowing on one bank, the relationship lender.
Partly contradictory results are delivered by the models of Rajan (1992) and von
Thadden (2004). The model of Rajan (1992) shows an additional reason why rela-
tionship lending may be costly, namely the hold-up problem. Unlike arm’s-length
lenders, relationship lenders obtain private information about borrowers which en-
ables them to stop ineﬃcient projects, but gives them also an ”information monopoly”.
They could threat not to prolong a loan, thereby enforcing relatively high interest
rates and reducing the incentives of the ﬁrm’s owner. Thus, relationship lend-
ing is valuable for stopping ineﬃcient projects whereas arm’s length debt is good
for providing high incentives. Rajan shows that ﬁrms of low credit quality prefer
arm’s-length debt, whereas ﬁrms with medium-quality projects tend to choose a
relationship lender. High quality ﬁrms are indiﬀerent.
The model of von Thadden (2004) analyzes also the hold-up-problem, but, unlike
Rajan (1992), it is assumed that binding long-term contracts are not possible (see
4also Sharpe (1990)). At the reﬁnancing stage, the terms of the credit contract
are then determined by competition between the inside (relationship) lender and
potential outside investors. He shows that there is a positive selection process where
bad ﬁrms are more likely than high quality ﬁrms to switch from the insider lender to
an arm’s-length bank. Therefore, high-quality ﬁrms are more likely to be ﬁnanced
by relationship lenders.
We measure a ﬁrm’s creditworthiness with its probability of default (PD), which is
derived from a separate model.
Hypothesis 3 summarises the above discussion:
Hypothesis 3: The probability of relationship lending depends on the bor-
rower’s creditworthiness.
Hypothesis 3a: The probability of relationship lending decreases with the bor-
rower’s creditworthiness. [Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)]
Hypothesis 3b: The probability of relationship lending is low for ﬁrms of low
credit quality, high for medium-quality ﬁrms and mediocre for
high-quality ﬁrms. [Rajan (1992)]
Hypothesis 3c: The probability of relationship lending increases with the bor-
rower’s creditworthiness. [von Thadden (2004)]
3 Data
Next, we shall present the data used for our empirical study, namely the databases
used to compose the ﬁnal data set underlying the actual study and the respective
data set referred to.
The ﬁnal database used in this study is composed of three diﬀerent databases
of the Deutsche Bundesbank: i) the German credit register (”MiMiK”), contain-
ing single bank-ﬁrm credit relationships, ii) balance sheet data of German ﬁrms
5(”Jalys/Ustan”) and iii) balance sheet data and audit reports of German banks
(”BAKIS”). The data set used for this study thereby provides information as to
whether a bank grants credit to a speciﬁc ﬁrm (through data set i) as well as the
characteristics of the corresponding ﬁrms (ii) and banks (iii).
(i) Credit register (MiMiK)
The credit register contains quarterly data on large exposures of banks to individual
borrowers or single borrower units (eg groups). Banking institutions located in
Germany are required to submit reports if their exposures to an individual borrower
or the sum of exposures to borrowers belonging to one borrower unit exceeds the
threshold of EUR 1.5m (formerly DEM 3m) once in the respective quarter.4 As the
banks have to report the quarter-end indebtedness, and due to the borrower unit
rule, a signiﬁcant portion of single exposures in the database are below EUR 1.5m
(see Schmieder (2006).) In the German credit register, the concept of indebtedness
is broadly deﬁned, i.e. the concept of ”credit” comprises a wide range of on-balance
and oﬀ-balance sheet loans and bonds, but positions of the trading book are not
included.5
The information contained in the credit register is considerable and makes it a valu-
able basis for research projects: In the last quarter of 2004, for example, the credit
register contained more than 750,000 reported bank-borrower-relationships. Besides
credit exposure, the German credit register collects other information about borrow-
ers, namely their name, domicile, country, legal form, assignment to a borrower unit
and the industry sector. As for the lender, the name and banking group are recorded.
When using this register for academic purposes, one has to be very careful in order to
avoid double-counting exposures contained in the credit register.6 For the underlying
study, sources for double-counting have been systematically investigated and taken
into account as outlined below in order to avoid misleading results. First, the credit
4 See section 14 of the German Banking Act.
5 In 1996 changes were made to the deﬁnition of credit exposures and reporting institutions. In
particular, credit derivatives were included in the deﬁnition of credit exposures and the concept
of ”single borrower unit” was extended to include risk units.
6 The reason is that the German credit register was established for regulatory purposes and not
primarily for academic studies. See also Schmieder (2006)
6register does not only contain direct loans, but also guarantees, namely cases where
banks provide a guarantee for a loan of another bank. In the latter case, the name
of the bank which beneﬁts from the guarantee is not available. Given that both
a direct loan and a guarantee show a lending relationship omitting guarantees for
the current analysis would be misleading. The consequence is as follows: while the
inclusion of guarantees may overstate exposures at the disaggregated level of single
ﬁrm-bank relationships (which will be taken into account), the credit register nets
out guarantees at the borrower level.
Second, double-counting may occur because of loans to civil-law associations (”Gesell-
schaften b¨ urgerlichen Rechts”). The indebtedness of such associations is not only
shown in the data of the respective association, but is also reﬂected in the indebt-
edness of individual borrowers that are partners of the civil-law association and
liable for the association’s debt. To prevent double-counting of exposures, loans to
civil-law associations are omitted from our analysis, and we calculate the borrowers’
indebtedness excluding their liabilities to civil-law associations.
Third, the indebtedness of borrower units may be overstated, as it is calculated
simply by summing up all loans to borrowers belonging to this unit. Compared
with balance sheet data of a proportionate consolidated group, the sum of loans in
the credit register may be much higher than in the balance sheet. However, given
the very limited number of borrower units in this study (11 of 3231 companies), the
eﬀect can be regarded as negligible.
ii) Corporate balance sheet data
Jalys/USTAN, the corporate balance sheet database of the Bundesbank, is one of
the most comprehensive databases for German non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms. For the 1990s,
the database contains annual data for up to 60,000 ﬁrms. Since 1998, the number
of balance sheets in the sample has decreased, reaching a level of about 18,000 in
2004 (see below). Balance sheet information is available for roughly 140 items (both
from tax or trade balances). Furthermore, the database contains information on the
ﬁrms’ industry sectors, domicile, founding year, number of employees and type of
7accounts7.
The Jalys/USTAN database was established for the rediscount business of the
Deutsche Bundesbank. Until 1999, the Bundesbank was required to purchase bills of
exchange that were backed by three parties known to be solvent. German ﬁrms were
obliged to submit their annual accounts to the Bundesbank for examination of their
creditworthiness. The drop in the number of accounts since 1998 is connected to
the fact that the discount credit facility in the context of bill-based lending was not
included by the European Central Bank in its set of monetary policy instruments
(see Bundesbank (2001)).
Two aspects are of special interest. First, small SMEs tend to be underrepresented
in the data set, particularly for the more recent years. However, one has to keep in
mind that, contrary to other data sets, SMEs are included in the ﬁrst place and that
the data are extensive for both medium-sized and large companies. Second, resulting
from the collection mechanism a certain quality bias seems to exist. For the 1990s,
the bias is relatively limited (see Stoess (2001)). For the period since 2000, the data
set is representative for medium-sized and large companies, but, concerning smaller
ﬁrms (ie smaller SMEs), there is a bias towards high-quality ﬁrms (see Ismer et al.
(2007)). We will account for this fact in the regressions.
(iii) The balance sheet data of the German banks (BAKIS)
This database comprises the annual balance sheets and proﬁt & loss accounts of all
German banks and of some types of ﬁnancial service providers (trade balances). In
addition, it contains the yearly quantitative audit reports, which include information
about the bank’s loan quality and its regulatory capital. The database consists of up
to about 250 items of the annual accounts and 300 items of the audit reports. Due to
the ongoing consolidation in the German banking sector, the number of institutions
included in BAKIS went down from about 3,900 in 1993 to roughly 3,000 in 2004.
(iv) Matched data set
For the purpose of this study, we used merged data from all three data sources.
7 The structure of the accounts changed for balance sheets collected after 2002. In general, the
structure became more detailed. For some positions, though, a one-to-one translation of the
old scheme to the new one is not possible.
8Whereas the German credit register and the balance sheet data of German banks
(BAKIS) are based on a common identiﬁer for banks and can therefore be easily
merged, the match between the credit register and the corporate balance sheet data
proved being diﬃcult as there is no common identiﬁer for the ﬁrms: The ﬁrms were
matched based on ﬁve criteria: i) their name, ii) location, iii) legal form, iv) their
industry and v) an indicator comparing a ﬁrm’s total indebtedness as stated by the
credit register relative to bank loans shown by the balance sheet data. The last
two criteria were primarily used as additional criteria in case of uncertainty about
the validity of the match.8 If two ﬁrms in the credit register and in Jalys/USTAN
diﬀered only to a minor extent regarding the ﬁrst three criteria, we checked whether
the ﬁrm changed its name, legal form or domicile. Besides, additional information
from the internet was used to check the correctness of the match.
As mentioned above, we also compared a ﬁrm’s indebtedness according to the credit
register and a ﬁrm’s bank loans according to Jalys/USTAN for the match. While this
comparison is generally meaningful, two caveats have to be mentioned for the un-
derlying case: First, Jalys/USTAN contains only bank loans included in the balance
sheet. The credit register, however, comprises on- and oﬀ-balance sheet bank loans,
and information about the type of loan is only available from mid-1996. Second,
the two data sources refer to diﬀerent deﬁnitions. Whereas Jalys/USTAN applies a
legal deﬁnition of indebtedness, the credit register follows an economic perspective:
a ﬁrm’s bonds (or bills of exchange) hold by a bank are classiﬁed as bonds (or bills of
exchange) in the corporate balance sheet statistics, for example, but as bank loans
in the credit register. Moreover, if a bank grants a loan to a borrower in which
it holds a stake, this particular ’loan’ is classiﬁed as a loan in the credit register,
but as a shareholder’s loan in Jalys/USTAN. Besides, the credit register may also
understate a ﬁrm’s bank loans: Written oﬀ loans, for example, are not included in
the credit register yet are included in Jalys/USTAN. Due to these diﬀerences, we
used the ratio between the indebtedness according to the credit register and bank
8 The industry classiﬁcation is to some extent discretionary. Regarding comparisons of indebt-
edness, see the discussion below.
9loans in Jalys/USTAN only to indicate the correctness of the match.
We matched 3,288 ﬁrms for which the credit register and Jalys/USTAN contained
overlapping data at least for one year. We eliminated 57 ﬁrms (or 277 observations)
where the total indebtedness according to the credit register exceeded total assets
according to Jalys/USTAN, therefore making data errors very likely.9 The ﬁnal
match data set used for this study consists of annual data for 3,231 ﬁrms of which
only 11 companies are borrower units, for the period from 1993 to 2004.
In order to align the data sources with one another, the higher frequency of the
quarterly credit register data was reduced in two ways: i) by taking the values of
the quarter to which the accounts (Jalys/USTAN) refer to and ii) by calculating four-
quarter averages. Whereas the former method is more precise, the latter method
may mitigate one of the shortcomings of the credit register, namely that only loans
above EUR 1.5m are included. By referring to averages of quarterly values (case
ii), smaller loans which exceed the threshold only in one quarter are more likely to
be captured. Our ﬁnal data set contains 15,947 observations when aggregating with
method i) and 16,349 observations when aggregating with method ii).
The resulting overall database has three dimensions: a time dimension, a dimension
for the lenders and a dimension for the borrowers. In order to be able to use a panel
framework, one of the three dimensions of the data set was eliminated: the lender
dimension, to be replaced by means of summarising statistics of all lenders of a ﬁrm.
The respective procedure is explained in Appendix 1.
One might be concerned about the representativeness of our ﬁnal data set. In
principle, the ﬁnal data set might be biased because of two reasons: i) due to
the matching procedure companies may have not selected randomly and ii) due
to truncation in the credit register a company’s indebtedness may not shown in a
reliable way. We will discuss both problems in the following.
9 Potential errors in the source data were accounted for as follows: If only one or two observations
of one matched ﬁrm showed a ratio (of the total indebtedness according to the credit register to
the total assets according to Jalys/USTAN) above 100%, we eliminated only these observations,
as data errors seemed to be random. However, if more than half of the observations of a matched
ﬁrm showed a ratio above 100%, we excluded all observations of the respective ﬁrm as the data
errors were apparently systematic in these cases.
10Table 3 and 4 contain information regarding problem i) and compare our ﬁnal data
set with the ﬁrms in the balance sheet statistics which have not been matched. It gets
clear that the typical ﬁrm in our ﬁnal data set is about 3 times larger (measured in
terms of sales) than the typical not matched ﬁrm. This size bias becomes also evident
when the ﬁnal data set is compared to the total credit register data.10. Nonetheless,
the median ﬁrm in the ﬁnal sample is still relatively small and generates a revenue
of EUR 16m. Besides, the balance sheet statistics is rather problematic regarding
small companies (see page 8) as well as the credit register is as the threshold of EUR
1.5m is especially acute for small companies.
Table 3 also shows some information about the debt structure of matched and not
matched ﬁrms. The match was conditional on the fact that a ﬁrm has at least one
lending relationship. Thus, our ﬁnal data set does not contain companies which
borrow only from non-banks and rely, for example, only on trade credits. This fact
explains why the share of loans to total assets is a little bit higher in the ﬁnal data
set than in the data base of all not matched ﬁrms. Table 4 shows the industry
structure of the two data sets. There are signiﬁcant diﬀerences concerning some
industries. For example, the share of retail trade is in the ﬁnal sample only half of
the value of all not matched ﬁrms, probably due to the fact that especially many
small companies belong to this industry. However, the industry structure of the
data sets are overall similar.
Table 5 contains information about the potential bias in our ﬁnal data set caused by
the threshold of EUR 1.5m in the credit register (problem ii). The table shows two
alternative ratios combining values of the indebtedness in the credit register with
information from the balance sheet, ie i) the ratio of balance sheet indebtedness in
the credit register to bank loans in the ﬁrm’s balance sheet statistics and ii) the
relation of total indebtedness in the credit register to bank loans, total bonds and
acceptances. It becomes evident that the credit register is likely to contain the bulk
of banks’ claims for most companies in our sample. However, there are a number
10 The median loan in the total credit register data is about EUR 1.5m (only positive loans
considered), the median loan in the ﬁnal sample is EUR 2.7m.
11of companies where the debt values in the credit register and in the ﬁrms’ balance
sheet statistics are not comparable and the indebtedness in the credit register is
even larger than in the ﬁrm’s balance sheet statistics as in the latter data set banks’
claims may be included in trade credits or other positions.
Overall, our data set seems suitable to examine the determinants of relationship
lending. However, one has to keep in mind that our data sample is not representative
regarding very small companies and that we restricted our sample to companies
which have at least one lending relationship with a bank.
4 Descriptive statistics and ﬁrst results
4.1 Descriptive statistics
Deﬁnition of relationship lending
We refer to the deﬁnition of relationship lending posited by Petersen and Rajan
(1994). Accordingly, relationship lending exists if a ﬁrm has close ties to a ﬁnancial
institution. The empirical literature suggests several possible indicators to measure
relationship lending, such as the duration of a bank-borrower relationship, the num-
ber of lending relationships or a high share of debt ﬁnancing by one bank.11 We
take the latter, namely (i) a high portion of debt ﬁnancing by one bank, as our main
indicator.12 However, we also consider (ii) the number of lending relationships as
an alternative measure in order to enhance the robustness of the results.
According to deﬁnition (ii), we call a bank a relationship lender if a ﬁrm has one sin-
gle lending relationship with a bank in contrast to another ﬁrm which has multiple
lending relationships (RL100%). The reasoning for choosing the number of lending
relationships as a proxy is that exclusivity of a bank relationship fosters the ties be-
tween banks and ﬁrms. However, focussing on the number of lending relationships
11 See eg Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Ongena and Smith (2001).
12 It turns out that a bank that is the dominant lender in one year tends to be the dominant lender
in the following year. Therefore, ﬁrms with a dominant lender tend to have long relationships
with this lender, ie the ﬁrst and third measure of relationship lending are correlated.
12alone may be too restrictive: While this deﬁnition may be appropriate for some
ﬁrms, particularly smaller ones, larger ﬁrms will typically have several lending rela-
tionships.13 In order to account for more general cases, we also deﬁne relationship
lending as the case in which there exists a bank with a dominant exposure and set
the threshold to 80% (RL80%) or 90% (RL90%) of the total bank loans of this ﬁrm
(case (i)).
A high share of ﬁnancial debt at one bank, has empirically been shown to be a good
proxy for relationship lending. Elsas (2005) empirically examined the quality of
several potential indicators for relationship lending, eg number of lending relation-
ships and the duration of the relationship. He asked the banks for each customer in
his sample if they classiﬁed themselves as relationship lender and compared these
self assessments with the diﬀerent possible indicators for relationship lending. It is
shown that a high portion of debt ﬁnancing by one bank has the highest explanatory
power.
In the following, we refer to a dummy variable for deﬁnition (i) and the logarithmised
number of lending relationships (deﬁnition ii). Both measures are only based on
information from the credit register, as the deﬁnitions of debt are too diﬀerent in
the credit register and the corporate accounts statistics. We may thereby overstate
a bank’s debt ﬁnancing (as part of bank loans are not shown in the credit register).
To account for this fact, we apply relatively strict measures of relationship lending
(minimum share of a ﬁrm’s bank loans of 80% or even more), so the identiﬁed
relationship lenders are likely to be those found via more common deﬁnitions of
relationship lending and ”full” information on the credit side.
Descriptive statistics
Table 6 contains descriptive statistics for our main indicator of relation lending,
a high concentration of borrowing. Accordingly, 58% (54%) of the ﬁrms in the
sample raise at least 80% (90%) of their bank loans from one bank (aggregation
method i) (values of the balance sheet quarter)). The ﬁgures are slightly lower
13 In our sample, the average number of lending relationships is 2.7, while Degryse et al. (2004)
report a mean of around 1.3 lending relationships for Belgium and Sapienza (2002) 9 for Italy.
13using aggregation method ii) (averages of quarterly values).
Table 7 gives information on the distribution of the number of lending relationships
in the sample. Using aggregation method i) nearly 50% of the companies in the sam-
ple have only one lending relationship and roughly 90% of the ﬁrms have 5 lending
relationships or less. The maximum is 115 lending relationships. With aggregation
method ii) the share of ﬁrms with only one lending relationship goes down to 40%,
reﬂecting the higher likelihood that a ﬁrm has only one lending relationship for one
quarter than for four quarters. The shares of having two or more lending relation-
ships increase slightly, so that the 90%- and higher quantiles are similar to the other
distribution.
Table 8 shows the pairwise correlations of diﬀerent house bank indicators. The
correlation between the logarithmised number of lending relations, RL80% and RL90%
(each variable according to both aggregation methods) is at least (-)71% . At the
0.1% level, all variables are signiﬁcantly correlated. This makes it clear that the
indicators contain very similar information.
Table 9 summarises descriptive statistics for our explanatory variables. We use a
default risk measure (PD), which is calculated from the balance sheet data and can
be interpreted as a probability of default.14 For the empirical study, we censorized
the proﬁtability measure (return on assets) at one percent and 99% to deal with
potential data outliers.15
4.2 First results
Next, we investigate our hypotheses using some descriptive statistics and simple
tests before moving forward to the regressions. We concentrate on one indicator,
concentration of debt of at least 80% at one bank. Table 10 shows that there is a
strong negative correlation between a ﬁrm’s size and its concentration of borrowing.
14 For this purpose, we used a binary logistic regression model based on balance sheet data
between 12 and 24 months before default classiﬁed as default balance sheets. See Krueger
et al. (2005) for further information.
15 This means that we set those proﬁtability values below (above) the 1%-quantile (99%-quantile)
exactly equal to the respective quantile.
14The share of companies which borrow at least 80% of their credit from one bank
steadily decreases with ﬁrm size. The same holds true for the share of the largest
lender. This outcome is in line with our expectations (Hypothesis 1) that especially
small informationally opaque ﬁrms choose a relationship lender.
Table 11 gives the means of ﬁrm variables subject to diﬀerent size classes and con-
ditioned by the relationship lending status. More speciﬁcally, ﬁrm age, R&D inten-
sity and variables about a ﬁrm’s quality (for example equity ratio) interfere with
size and are therefore analysed conditional on the ﬁrm size. Table 11 shows that
R&D-intensive ﬁrms are more likely to choose a relationship lender. In each size
class, companies with a relationship lender have a signiﬁcantly higher R&D intensity
than companies without a relationship lender. The only exception are very large
companies where no signiﬁcant diﬀerence exists. This evidence is consistent with
Hypothesis 2 according to which R&D-intensive companies are exposed to higher
information asymmetries and therefore tend to concentrate their borrowing on one
bank. However, the relation between age and choosing a relationship lender is not
in line with hypothesis 1. Whereas small companies with a relationship lender are,
on average, signiﬁcantly older than small companies without a relationship lender,
the reverse is true for large companies.
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c examine the inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s quality on relationship
lending. Accordingly, the relationship between a ﬁrm’s credit quality (measured
by its PD or equity ratio) and the likelihood of relationship lending can be nega-
tive, inversely u-shaped or positively. As table 11 shows, medium-sized and large
companies with a relationship lender exhibit signiﬁcantly higher equity ratios and
signiﬁcant lower PD-values than medium-sized and large companies without a re-
lationship lender, while small companies do not diﬀer signiﬁcantly with respect to
both variables. This evidence indicates that high-quality ﬁrms above a certain size
threshold tend to choose a relationship lender which is in line with hypothesis 3c
and to some extent with hypothesis 3b.
Table 12 contains information how regional competition in the lenders’ market (mea-
sured by the Hirschman-Herﬁndahl index, HHI) inﬂuences relationship lending. Re-
15lationship lending is unlikely if the HHI is very low and regional competition in the
lender’s market is very high. In the next section, we apply regression techniques to
further examine the above hypotheses.
5 Regressions
In the regressions, we focus on the variable ”high share of debt ﬁnancing by one
bank (80% level)” as an indicator of relationship lending (RL80%). Additionally, we
run regressions with alternative indicators of relationship lending.
As our dependent variable is a dummy variable, we use probability models. A
shortcoming of probability models for panel data sets is that a ﬁxed eﬀects regression
is only possible for such observations where the dependent variable changed at least
once during the sample period. The other observations are excluded from the sample
(see Baltagi (2005)). This may lead to a bias as ﬁrms that change their relationship
lending status may be systematically diﬀerent than the excluded ﬁrms, namely (i)
the ﬁrms that permanently choose a relationship lender and (ii) ﬁrms that have
permanently several important lending relationships. Therefore, it is diﬃcult to
decide which model - ﬁxed or random eﬀects model - is appropriate, as a standard
Hausman test compares the results of two models with diﬀerent sets of observations.
Furthermore, in the case of our regressions, the Hausman test statistics do not
show clear results (the diﬀerence between the ﬁxed and the random eﬀects model is
signiﬁcant only at the 10% level). We thus use a ﬁxed and a random eﬀects model
and discuss the results of both models.
Table 13 summarises the regression results. We consider the lenders’ average size as
control variable which is highly signiﬁcant in statistical and economic terms. The
negative sign is in line with evidence for Italy according to which especially small
banks act as single or relationship lenders (see Detragiache et al. (2000)). Small
banks probably have an advantage in processing soft information which is especially
valuable for relationship lending (see Stein (2000)).
16We also control for the degree of competition as measured by the Hirschmann-
Herﬁndahl-Index (HHI). We ﬁnd that relationship lending tends to get more likely
the lower the HHI and therefore the higher the competition in the lender’s market
is. The variable is signiﬁcant only in the random eﬀects speciﬁcations. This re-
sult is generally consistent with the predictions of the model of Boot and Thakor
(2000). The authors show that increasing competition between banks leads to more
relationship banking and less transaction banking, as relationship orientation helps
to partially insulate the banks from pure price competition. The result contradicts
Petersen and Rajan (1995). Besides, we control for the type of balance sheet (tax
or trade balance) the information about the ﬁrm is taken from. The variable is
generally not signiﬁcant.
Moreover, we included year dummies to examine the time trend in our data set.
Generally, the dummies are signiﬁcant neither in the random nor in the ﬁxed ef-
fects model. The coeﬃcients do not show a clear trend and depend heavily on the
speciﬁcation (eg model 3 versus model 5). Therefore, our results do not support the
common view that banks have developed to credit factories and relationship lending
has become less important.
According to Hypothesis 1 we expect informationally opaque small, young companies
to prefer relationship lending. Concentrating their borrowing on one bank may help
such ﬁrms to reduce information asymmetries and to avoid credit rationing. The
results show that age and especially size are statistically and economically important
variables for determining the probability of choosing a relationship lender. If size
increases by 1%, the probability of relationship lending decreases by 4% in the
random eﬀects model. The coeﬃcient in the ﬁxed eﬀects model is roughly the same.
Age decreases the probability of relationship lending as well. Older companies are
signiﬁcantly less likely to choose relationship lending. If age increases by 1%, the
probability of relationship lending decreases by about 0.25% (random eﬀects model).
Surprisingly, the eﬀect of age is about three and a half times larger in the ﬁxed eﬀects
than in the random eﬀects model.
Hypotheses 2 examines whether R&D- and knowledge-intensive ﬁrms are more likely
17to choose a relationship lender. If relationship lending is an eﬃcient instrument for
reducing information asymmetries, R&D- and knowledge-intensive companies should
concentrate their borrowing on one relationship lender, as R&D activities are linked
with proprietary information and information asymmetries are higher. We measure
R&D/knowledge intensity with a dummy variable which relies on long-term indus-
try averages. As this variable is time-constant, we can test Hypothesis 2 only in
a panel regression with random eﬀects. The results are in line with our predic-
tion: R&D/knowledge-intensive companies are signiﬁcantly more likely to choose a
relationship lender. The probability increases by 13 percentage points.
Hypotheses 3a, 3b and 3c examine the inﬂuence of the ﬁrm’s creditworthiness. The
theoretical literature is ambiguous regarding the eﬀect of a ﬁrm’s credit quality
on the probability of relationship lending. Depending on the theoretical model, a
negative, an inversely u-shaped or a positive relation is possible. We measure a ﬁrm’s
credit quality with its PD (probability of default) and include a linear and a squared
term to capture non-linear relations. At ﬁrst glance, table 13 indicates a u-shaped
inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s PD on the probability of relationship lending and thus does
not support either of these predictions. The linear and the squared term are both
signiﬁcant. However, when calculating the combined eﬀect over the range of relevant
PD values it becomes clear that the inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s PD is negative for most
observations. A ﬁrm’s creditworthiness aﬀects the probability of relationship lending
positively only for very high PD values (values beyond the 98% quantile for ﬁxed and
random eﬀects model). Overall, the results are consistent with Hypothesis 3c which
is based on the model of von Thadden (2004). Accordingly, there exists a selection
process over time where good ﬁrms stay at their relationship bank and bad ﬁrms
choose an arm’s-length bank. On average, relationship lenders thus ﬁnance ﬁrms of
higher credit quality than arm’s length banks do. The results are also to some extent
consistent with hypothesis 3b (model of Rajan (1992)) as the hypothesis states
that high-quality ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between arm’s-length ﬁnance and relationship
lending. The model derives the decision for relationship lending from a trade-oﬀ
between an eﬃcient decision about which projects to ﬁnance versus providing high
18incentives to exert eﬀort.
The results are not in line with the model of Bolton and Scharfstein, which predicts
a negative inﬂuence of a ﬁrm’s credit quality on the likelihood of relationship lend-
ing (Hypothesis 3a). The authors derive the optimal numbers of creditors from a
trade-oﬀ between preventing strategic defaults and high renegotiation costs in the
case of liquidity defaults. The model also makes the prediction that companies from
non-cyclical industries prefer relationship lending. We tested this prediction, too,
measuring cyclicality by the long-run sensitivity of each industry’s gross value added
to changes in the aggregated gross value added.16 However, we cannot observe a sig-
niﬁcant eﬀect. Thus, neither variable conﬁrms the model of Bolton and Scharfstein
(1996).
One may be concerned that endogeneity problems may inﬂuence our results and may
lead to reverse causality. For example, age may not only inﬂuence the likelihood
of choosing a relationship lender, but the existence of a relationship lender may
also increase a ﬁrm’s survival probability and thereby the age distribution in our
sample. Endogeneity problems may be relevant with regard to age and size, but are
probably minor important or not relevant with regard to a ﬁrm’s R&D-intensity or
a ﬁrm’s creditworthiness. However, as to age and size, endogeneity issues work into
the opposite direction as our hypothesis states. Whereas our hypothesis states that
young and small companies should choose a relationship lender, the endogeneity bias
would lead to the eﬀect that old and large companies are ﬁnanced by relationship
lenders. Therefore, if there is an endogenity bias, it would reduce the eﬀect of age
and size. This may also explain the below results that age is not robustly signiﬁcant.
Robustness checks
We ran several robustness checks. Firstly we checked whether the inﬂuence of ﬁrm’s
size is due to information asymmetries or due to the fact that banks avoid concen-
tration risks. Larger companies need, on average, more capital, which increases the
16 Data: Statistisches Bundesamt. We run regressions for each industry with the industry’s
gross value added as the dependent variable and the aggregated gross value added as the
explanatory variable in addition to including a constant. The sensitivities then correspond
with the regression coeﬃcient.
19concentration risk in the bank’s portfolio given the bank’s size. We therefore ran a
new regression excluding all companies from the sample where
P
loans of companyi
liable capital of company i’s smallest bank
> 5%.17
In the new regression, the coeﬃcient of size goes down sharply, in the ﬁxed eﬀects
model by over 30%, in the random eﬀects model even by nearly 40%. However, the
coeﬃcient is still signiﬁcant at the 1%-level in both models. We also ran a regression
where we lowered the threshold further to 2%. Here, the eﬀects are a little bit more
pronounced than in the model with a threshold of 5%, but the variables are, once
again, signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.
Secondly, we ran several regressions to check how the problem of truncation in the
credit register inﬂuences the results. As loans of less than EUR 1.5 million are only
partly reported (see Section 3), the credit register shows a biased picture of the debt
structure of companies. Firstly, we constructed variables combining information
from the credit register (CR) with the balance sheet statistics (BS). Data from these
two data sources may diﬀer because i) loans of less than EUR 1.5m are only partly
reported in the credit register and ii) the data sources apply diﬀerent deﬁnitions
of debt. As we are only interested in the eﬀects of truncation, we constructed a
new indicator for relationship lending in two steps. In the ﬁrst step, we created
an auxiliary variable which classiﬁes a borrower as a customer with a relationship
lender if
RLtemp = 1 if
largest loan according to CR
P
bank loans according to BS
> 80%.18
RLtemp = 0 otherwise
17 The Large Exposures Regulation (”Grosskreditrichtlinie”) sets a limit of 10% above which
exposures have to be reported to the Bundesbank.
18 The credit register contains information about the structure of debt (oﬀ-balance sheet versus
on-balance sheet) only since 1997. Therefore, we used data on total loans until 1996 and data
on on-balance sheet loans since 1997.
20We use a narrow deﬁnition of debt and include only bank loans in the denominator
(see discussion in Section 3, especially Table 5). When we compare the new variable
with our old indicator RL80%, the two variables are identical in the ideal case. If the
new one is 0 and the old one is 1, this is probably due to truncation in the register
as for example smaller exposures of other banks are not shown. However, if the new
one is 1 and the old one is 0, this combination is probably due to diﬀerent deﬁnitions
in the data sources. We thus combined the two indicators:
RLBSCR = min[RL80%,RLtemp]
Table 14 shows the results using RLBSCR as the dependent variable (model 3 and
4). The results diﬀer quantitatively, but are qualitatively similar. The coeﬃcients
of size and R&D intensity are smaller with the new indicator and the eﬀect of age is
not signiﬁcant in the ﬁxed eﬀects model. We also ran regressions where we built our
auxiliary variable refering to a broader deﬁnition of debt (bank loans, acceptances
and bonds) and built the new combined indicator based on this broader deﬁnition.
The results are similar to the speciﬁcation with RLBSCR. Except for age, these
regressions conﬁrm our above results.
The credit register shows a more reliable picture for those companies where the
sum of loans from the credit register is relatively high compared to the debt in the
balance sheet. Therefore, we ran a second robustness check regarding truncation by
restricting our observations to those companies where the sum of loans in the credit
register is least 80% of the corresponding amount in the balance sheet statistics.19
As Table 14 (model 5 and 6) shows, coeﬃcients and signiﬁcance levels change only
minor. Size, age and credit quality are signiﬁcant in the random and the ﬁxed eﬀects
speciﬁcation as well as R&D-intensity in the random eﬀects model (which cannot
be considered in the ﬁxed eﬀects model).
Furthermore, as especially small companies are exposed to the problem of truncation,
we conducted a third robustness check with respect to truncation where we excluded
19 We used the ﬁrst coverage ratio of Table 5 as the indicator. As the credit register provides
information about balance sheet loans only since 1997, we used a ﬁrm’s total indebtedness
before 1997.
21small companies (assets below median) from our sample. The regression also leads
to similar results (results not reported).
Finally, we conducted several robustness checks with respect to our dependent vari-
able. We used the (log of) the number of relationships as the dependent variable.
The results are similar to those above except that age is not signiﬁcant anymore,
while the signiﬁcance of size increases. As the two variables are signiﬁcantly cor-
related, the coeﬃcient of size may also partly show the eﬀect of age. Moreover,
we changed the threshold of our relationship lending indicator. We increased (de-
creased) the threshold to 90% (70%), ie banks that ﬁnance at least 90% (70%) of a
ﬁrm’s loans are now classiﬁed as relationship lenders. The results are very similar
to the above results. Finally, we calculated our relationship lending indicator based
on aggregation method ii, which uses the yearly average values of the credit register
instead of the values of the balance sheet quarter. The results are once again very
similar.
6 Conclusion
In this study, we empirically analyse factors that determine relationship lending in
Germany. Unlike most previous empirical contributions, the data set used in this
study is much more comprehensive.
Departing from the theoretical literature, we examine the importance of two issues:
Firstly we investigate whether relationship lending reduces information asymmetries
and thereby helps credit rationing to be avoided. In line with this argument, we
ﬁnd that small, young and R&D-intensive ﬁrms tend to choose a relationship lender.
Whereas the eﬀect of size and age is a common result in the literature, the eﬀect
of the R&D-intensity is partly in contrast to the international evidence (see eg
Detragiache et al. (2000)). Due to underdeveloped equity markets in Germany
R&D-intensive ﬁrms rely more heavily on bank credits than in other countries.
Relationship lending may therefore be a substitute for equity ﬁnancing.
22Secondly, we examine how a ﬁrm’s credit quality inﬂuences the likelihood of rela-
tionship lending. From a theoretical point of view, the inﬂuence is not clear. We
ﬁnd that ﬁrms of high credit quality tend to choose a relationship lender. This is in
line with a positive selection process over time where good borrowers stay at their
relationship lender and bad borrowers switch to (outside) arm’s length banks.
Finally, we also investigate whether relationship lending became less important since
the mid 90s. Due to better information processing facilities, more sophisticated
rating tools and the growth of securitization market banks are said to be turning
more and more into credit factories. However, we cannot observe such a trend for
Germany, given our deﬁnition of relationship lending.
This data set makes it possible to investigate further important questions concerning
relationship lending. Possible research topics are: the duration of lending relation-
ships, the impact of relationship lending on a ﬁrm’s funding costs, and the behavior
of a relationship bank when the borrower is in ﬁnancial distress.
23References
Baltagi, B. H. (2005). Econometric Analysis of Panel Data. USA: John Wiley &
Sons.
Bhattacharaya, S. and A. Thakor (1993). Contemporary banking theory. Journal
of Financial Intermediation 2, 2–50.
Bolton, P. and D. Scharfstein (1996). Optimal debt structure and the number of
creditors. Journal of Political Economy 104, 1–25.
Boot, A. W. A. (2000). Relationship banking: What do we know? Journal of
Financial Intermediation 9, 7–25.
Boot, A. W. A. and A. V. Thakor (2000). Can relationship banking survive compe-
tition? Journal of Finance 55, 679–713.
Bundesbank, D. (2001). West German enterprises’ proﬁtability and ﬁnancing in
1999. Monatsbericht.
Degryse, H., N. Masschelein, and J. Mitchell (2004). Smes and bank lending rela-
tionships: The impact of mergers. NBB WORKING PAPER No. 46.
Detragiache, E., P. Garella, and L. Guiso (2000). Multiple versus single banking
relationships. Journal of Finance 55, 1133–1161.
Dewatripont, M. and E. Maskin (1995). Credit and eﬃciency in centralized and
dezentralized economies. Review of Economic Studies 62, 541–555.
Elsas, R. (2005). Empirical determinants of relationship lending. Journal of Finan-
cial Intermediation 14, 32–57.
Elsas, R. and J. P. Krahnen (1998). Is relationship lending special? Evidence from
credit ﬁles in Germany. Journal of Banking and Finance 22, 1283–1316.
Grupp, H. and H. Legler (2000). Hochtechnologie 2000 - Neudeﬁnition der Hochtech-
nologie f¨ ur die Berichterstattung zur technologischen Leistungsf¨ ahigkeit Deutsch-
lands. Karlsruhe, Hannover.
24Ismer, R., A. Kaul, I. Stein, and M. Wolf (2007). Determinan-
ten der Finanzierungsstrukturen deutscher Unternehmen unter besonderer
Ber¨ ucksichtigung des Einﬂusses der Steuergesetzgebung, Kurzgutachten f¨ ur das
Bundesministerium der Finanzen.
Krueger, U., M. Stoetzel, and S. Trueck (2005). Time series properties of a rating
system based on ﬁnancial ratios. Discussion Paper No 14/2005 Deutsche Bundes-
bank, Banking and Financial Supervision.
Machauer, A. and M. Weber (2000). Number of bank relationships: An indicator of
competition, borrower quality, or just size? CFS Discussion Paper No. 2000/06.
Neuberger, D. and S. R¨ athke (2006). Microenterprises and multiple bank relation-
ships: Evidence from a survey among professionals. Working paper, University of
Rostock.
Ongena, S. and D. Smith (2001). The duration of bank relationships. Journal of
Financial Economics 61, 449–475.
Petersen, M. and R. Rajan (1994). The beneﬁts of lending relationships: Evidence
from small business data. Journal of Finance 49, 3–37.
Petersen, M. and R. Rajan (1995). The eﬀects of credit market competition on
lending relationships. Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 407–443.
Rajan, R. (1992). Insiders and outsiders: The choice between relationship and arms
length debt. Journal of Finance 47, 1367–1400.
Sapienza, P. (2002). The eﬀects of banking mergers on loan contracts. Journal of
Finance 57, 329–367.
Schmieder, C. (2006). The Deutsche Bundesbank’s large credit database (BAKIS-M
and MiMiK). Schmollers Jahrbuch 126, 653–663.
Sharpe, S. A. (1990). Asmmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts:
A stylized model of customer relationships. Journal of Finance 45, 1069–1087.
25Stein, J. (2000). Information production and capital allocation: Decentralized versus
hierarchical ﬁrms. NBER Working Paper Nro 7705.
Stoess, E. (2001). Deutsche Bundesbank’s corporate balance sheet statistics and
area of application. Schmollers Jahrbuch 121, 131–137.
von Thadden, E.-L. (2004). Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit
contracts: The winner’s curse. Finance Research Letters 1, 11–23.
26Appendix 1: Processing of data (Example)
The following appendix shows an imaginary example of how the raw data is pro-
cessed. From the credit register we obtain the following information about the
indebtedness of the four ﬁrms A1, A2, B and C with respect to the banks 1, 2, 3,
4 (See Table 1, please note that the ﬁrms A1 and A2 belong to the borrower unit
Table 1: Data from the Credit Register (extract)
Firm Bank Year Indebtedness (th EUR)
A1 1 1999 700
A1 2 1999 1800
A2 1 1999 900
B 1 1999 50000
B 2 1999 1600
B 4 1999 1400
C 3 1999 2000
A). As mentioned above (see 3), not all exposures reported in the credit register
are above the threshold of EUR 1.5m. The reason why bank 1 has to report the
exposures to the ﬁrms A1 and A2 is that the combined exposure, ie the exposure to
the borrower unit A, is above the threshold. The exposure of bank 4 to ﬁrm B has to
be reported because presumably this exposure was above the EUR 1.5m threshold
at least once in the preceding quarter (and the requirement to report depends on
the maximum exposure during the preceding quarter whereas the exposure to be
reported is that of the quarter end).
We condense the data set by i) aggregating the ﬁrms to borrower units where ad-
equate (ﬁrm in balance sheet statistics is a group) and ii) by replacing the lending
information by summary statistics. The data processing in our example results in
the data set as displayed in Table 2. Please note that the actual ﬁnal data set
additionally contains the ﬁrms’ and the banks’ balance sheets.
27Table 2: Final data set (extract)
Firm Year Total indebted- Largest bank Number of Share of largest Bank ID of
ness (th EUR) loan (th EUR) lending rel. bank loan relationship lender
A 1999 3400 1800 2 52.9% N/A
B 1999 53000 50000 3 94.3% 1
C 1999 2000 2000 1 100.0% 3
28Appendix 2
Table 3: ﬁnal sample versus not matched ﬁrms of balance sheet statistics
not matched ﬁrms ﬁnal sample
median N median N
Total Assets (EUR 1000) 2724 748540 10388 16349
Sales (EUR 1000) 5111 748540 16296 16349
Equity ratio (in %) 11.8 748484 14.1 16348
Loans to total assets (in %) 24.7 748484 26.9 16348





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 5: Coverage ratios
Quantiles
25% 50% 75%
Balance sheet indebtedness (credit register) to bank loans
(Jalys/Ustan)
72.9% 96.8% 104.2%
Total indebtedness (credit register) to bank loans, total
bonds and acceptances (Jalys/Ustan)
74.9% 98.7% 116.5%
The ﬁrst ratio can only be calculated for values from 1997 to 2004.
Table 6: Concentration of borrowing: descriptive statistics
Aggregation method i): Aggregation method ii):
Values of balance sheet quarter Means of quarterly values
RL80% RL90% RL80% RL90%
Share of observations 58.2 54.2 54.1 48.2
N 15947 15947 16349 16349
RL80% (RL90%) means that a ﬁrm concentrates at least 80% (90%) of its borrowing at one bank.
31Table 7: Distribution of lending relationships
Aggregation method i): Aggregation method ii):
Values of balance sheet quarter Means of quarterly values
Number of banks in % cumulative % in % cumulative %
1 49.2 49.2 41.0 41.0
2 20.4 69.6 22.2 63.1
3 10.4 80.0 12.1 75.2
4 5.9 85.9 6.6 81.8
5 3.9 89.7 4.6 86.4
6 2.7 92.5 3.6 90.0
7 1.8 94.3 2.1 92.1
8 1.3 95.5 1.8 93.8
9 0.8 96.3 1.1 94.9
10+ 3.7 100.0 5.1 100.0
The number of observations is 15947 using aggregation method i) and 16349 with aggregation
method ii).
Table 8: Correlation matrix of relationship lending indicators
Aggregation method i): Aggregation method ii):
Values of balance sheet quarter Means of quarterly values
ln NoB RL90% RL80% ln NoB RL90% RL80%
Method i) ln NoB 1
RL90% -0.80 1
RL80% -0.78 0.92 1
Method ii) ln NoB 0.94 -0.74 -0.73 1
RL90% -0.70 0.83 0.78 -0.77 1
RL80% -0.71 0.81 0.83 -0.75 0.89 1
ln NoB denotes the logarithmised number of lending relationships. RL90% and RL80% mean
concentration of bank borrowing of 90% and 80% respectively. All variables are signiﬁcantly
correlated at the 0.1%level.
32Table 9: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables
Variable Unit Obs Mean Std. Dev. Quantiles
25% 75%
Total assets (ﬁrm) EUR 1000 16349 126907 1541739 4293 34528
Age (ﬁrm) years 14477 44.4 41.8 16.0 63.0
Equity ratio (ﬁrm) % 16348 18.9 17.9 5.0 27.7
Return on assets (ﬁrm), % % 16347 4.7 14.1 0.1 8.6
Corporation (AG or KGaA), % % 16349 8.9
Limited liability corporation (GmbH), % % 16349 49.7
Cyclicality (ﬁrm’s industry), % % 14974 69.1 116.5 -6.0 138.4
R&D intensive (ﬁrm’s industry) % 16349 12.7
Total assets (banks) EUR m 16230 99399 128615 4349 148462
Regional HHI (bank), % % 16346 5.2 3.1 3.1 6.3
R&D intensity is a dummy variable which is equal to one if an industry was classiﬁed as R&D-
intensive in Grupp and Legler (2000). Cyclicality is measured as the long-run sensitivity of each
industry’s gross value added to changes in the aggregated gross value added.
Table 10: Relationship lending and size classes
N RL80% Share of largest lender
<= EUR 2.5m 1778 94.5 97.6
EUR 2.5m - 5m 2806 88.6 95.1
EUR 5m - 10m 3152 71.4 87.6
EUR 10m - 25m 3263 46.6 75.0
EUR 25m - 100m 2884 32.0 63.9




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 13: Panel regression
Model 1 Model 2
RL80% RL80%
log assets (ﬁrm) -1.170 -1.306
(25.15)*** (8.24)***
age (ﬁrm) -0.187 -0.664
(2.90)*** (2.43)**
PD (lagged, ﬁrm) -0.657 -0.493
(5.08)*** (2.78)***
squared PD (lagged, ﬁrm) 0.113 0.104
(3.91)*** (2.49)**
R&D intensive (ﬁrm’s industry) 0.583
(4.39)***
log assets (bank(s)) -0.381 -0.312
(13.59)*** (7.47)***
regional concentration (bank’s market) -0.038 -0.020
(2.60)*** (1.18)
tax balance 0.113 0.174
(1.14) (1.47)
year = 1995 -0.053 -0.019
(0.38) (0.13)
year = 1996 0.029 0.057
(0.20) (0.37)
year = 1997 0.073 0.135
(0.52) (0.84)
year = 1998 0.001 0.056
(0.00) (0.33)
year = 1999 0.217 0.303
(1.41) (1.68)*
year = 2000 0.188 0.264
(1.21) (1.40)
year = 2001 0.180 0.319
(1.12) (1.61)
year = 2002 0.300 0.565
(1.81)* (2.68)***
year = 2003 0.152 0.340
(0.88) (1.54)





Number of borrowers 1984 612
Panel method random ﬁxed
The table shows the coeﬃcients with the t-values in parentheses. The dependent variable is, in
both models, house bank, a dummy variable which is equal to one if the ﬁrm concentrates at least
80% of its borrowing on one bank.
The HHI shows the regional concentration. R&D intensity is a dummy variable which equals one
if the borrower’s industry is R&D- or knowledge-intensive. PD, concentration and cyclicality are
measured in percentage points. Firm’s and banks’ assets are measured in real terms.
***/**/* indicate statistically signiﬁcant results at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.
35Table 14: Panel regression
Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
RLBSCR RLBSCR RL80% RL80%
log assets (ﬁrm) -0.782 -0.809 -1.136 -0.815
(17.72)*** (5.35)*** (22.02)*** (4.26)***
age (ﬁrm) -0.121 -0.161 -0.217 -0.654
(1.90)* (0.60) (2.95)*** (1.85)*
PD (lagged, ﬁrm) -0.668 -0.551 -0.852 -0.576
(5.54)*** (3.31)*** (5.57)*** (2.71)***
squared PD (lagged, ﬁrm) 0.098 0.096 0.116 0.080
(4.19)*** (2.89)*** (3.56)*** (1.84)*
R&D intensive (ﬁrm’s industry) 0.257 0.519
(1.96)** (3.42)***
log assets (bank(s)) -0.122 -0.124 -0.369 -0.307
(4.61)*** (2.99)*** (10.61)*** (5.14)***
regional concentration (bank’s market) -0.036 -0.012 -0.049 -0.016
(2.45)** (0.68) (2.70)*** (0.71)
tax balance 0.050 0.082 0.124 0.291
(0.50) (0.68) (1.04) (1.92)*
year = 1995 0.176 0.198 0.032 0.017
(1.31) (1.36) (0.19) (0.09)
year = 1996 0.115 0.077 0.073 0.015
(0.85) (0.52) (0.44) (0.08)
year = 1997 -0.499 -0.615 0.046 0.021
(3.64)*** (3.96)*** (0.27) (0.10)
year = 1998 -0.348 -0.386 0.087 0.142
(2.44)** (2.34)** (0.49) (0.66)
year = 1999 -0.092 -0.080 0.311 0.411
(0.61) (0.45) (1.67)* (1.76)*
year = 2000 -0.072 -0.034 0.313 0.338
(0.48) (0.18) (1.66)* (1.40)
year = 2001 -0.119 -0.058 0.362 0.474
(0.77) (0.30) (1.86)* (1.87)*
year = 2002 0.022 0.165 0.435 0.730
(0.13) (0.80) (2.17)** (2.68)***
year = 2003 -0.118 -0.007 0.227 0.417
(0.69) (0.03) (1.09) (1.48)
year = 2004 0.220 0.402 0.815 1.029
(1.00) (1.50) (3.13)*** (3.12)***
Constant 8.356 15.991
(17.25)*** (25.99)***
Observations 10426 4427 7872 2557
Number of borrowers 1984 672 1750 410
Panel method random ﬁxed random ﬁxed
Model 3 and model 4 are robustness checks with an alternative relationship lending indicator.
Model 5 and 6 restrict the sample to those companies where the sum of loans in the credit register
is at least 80% of the amount in the balance sheet statistics.
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